Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43: Manufacturing and Trade by Friedrich A. Lutz
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43: Manufacturing and Trade





Chapter Title: Some Observations on the Liquidity Position of Manufacturing
Corporations in World War II
Chapter Author: Friedrich A. Lutz
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4825
Chapter pages in book: (p. 85 - 92).9.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LIQUIDITY
POSITION OF MANUFACTURING
CORPORATIONS IN WORLD WAR II
WHILE AN EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS of the implications of the
present liquidity position of manufacturing corporations is beyond
the scope of this study, a few observations are in order, to indicate
the economic significance of the results obtained in Chapter 8.
The question that is likely to be raised first concerns the mean-
ing of the absence of a considerable amount of excess liquidity, as
shown by our sample of large manufacturing corporations, so far
as the problem of reconversion from war to peacetime production
is concerned. If the results obtained for our sample are indicative
of the situation of all large manufacturing corporations,' then it
may, at first glance, appear, that not much of their cash and
marketable securities is free to be spent on reconversion. But this
conclusion is not warranted.
First, our analysis merely reveals that in 1943 large corpora-
tions did not hold considerably more liquid funds than were re-
quired to provide for payments that could be expected at that
time. The position in which the corporations will find themselves
at the en.d of the war is quite another matter. Their liquid funds
(particularly in the form of government securities) will be higher
than they were in 1943. On the other hand, it is doubtful that
their payments will increase as much as liquid funds, considering
that an expansion of the economic system from the 1943 level
can at best be a slow process and that price controls undoubtedly
will still present some obstacle to price and wage advances.
1 A comparison through the year 1942 of our sample of large manufacturingcor-
porations with a larger sample of 890 manufacturing corporations, which the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System put at the disposal of the Financial
Research Program for this purpose, indicates that the larger group shows, on the
whole, the same tendency as the smaller sample. For the larger group the figures for
the ratio of average cash plus marketable securities to payments from 1937 to 194.2
are, in percent, 10.8; 14.7; 15.7; 16.5; 13.7; 14.9.(For similar ratios for sample B,
see Chapter 8, Table 4.)
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Second, liquid funds may be set free by a reduction of certain
kinds of payments against which corporations have to hold par-
ticularly high liquid funds. Foremost among them are tax lia-
bilities. A reduction of these liabilities following a reduction of
tax rates would release a considerable amount of cash or market-
able securities which could be used for reconversion purposes.
The same is true for liquid funds held against claims by the gov-
ernment arising out of the renegotiation procedure, or funds held
to provide for the possibility of retroactive wage rises.'Wage
increases are not so likely to occur in the precarious employment
situation which may arise immediately after the war.
Third, many companies may expect that during the period of
reconversion their revenue from sales will fall off for a period of
some months, since sales to consumers can replace sales to the
government only after a time lag, the length of which is determined
by the time required for reconversion to peace production. During
this intermediate period payments for reconversion purposes will
have to be made. But although receipts from sales to consumers
will not come in immediately to fill the gap created by the decline
or cessation of government orders, a corresponding decrease of
total receipts will not necessarily occur.Receivables from the
government will fall due, and very substantial refunds will be paid
to the companies under various provisions of the income and
excess profits tax laws. The largest source of funds, however, will
be the compensation that corporations will obtain upon war con-
tract termination. They may obtain up to 90 percent of terminated
war contracts within a period of thirty days after proper applica-
tion has been made. In the meantime corporations, because of
the funds which they can expect from their claims, may draw on
the liquid funds then available even though by so doing they may
cause the ratio of liquid funds to payments to fall below the level
maintained in 1943.2
Fourth, any decline in the volume of payments during the tran-
sition period will set free liquid funds which, before the decline,
were tied up by the volume of transactions. The volume of pay-
ments is not likely to remain so high, per unit of time, during the
2Ifthe funds from the government come in with a time lag and the corporations
in the meantime deplete their liquid funds, part of the funds received from the gov-
ernment must, of course, be used to replete their liquid funds.Observations on Liquidity Position 87
reconversion periodas under war conditions.For instance,
General Motors estimates its peak employment during the war at
530,000 persons, but the peak employment after the war at
375,000.This suggests that the decline in payments for this
company will be considerable, and that funds will be set free which
can be used in the periodtransition even if the ratio of liquid
funds to payments is not allowed to fall below that maintained in
1943.
'Whether that part of marketable securities and cash in the
hands of the companies which can be spent on reconversion, to-
gether with the funds that they will obtain on war contract
termination and under various provisions of the income and profit
tax laws,issufficient to provide for reconversion needsisa
question on which a vast literature has arisen.3 The main purpose
of such studies is to find out whether or not corporations will
need outside funds from the banks and the capital market. It is
not our intention to add an estimate of our own. It will suffice to
point out some of the assumptions on which such estimates must
be based.
The first assumption concerns the volume of business to which
the corporations will reconvert, since the reconversion expenses
themselves depend on the level of activity which is assumed after
reconversion. Inasmuch as an estimate of reconversion expenses
requires the application of the sources and uses of funds analysis,
a further assumption has to be made about the structure of the
balance sheets of corporations after reconversion, which for the
most part can be based oniy on the structure of prewar balance
sheets. Yet in many cases methods of production and even the
products themselves will have changed; corporations will not con-
vert backward but forward. Assumptions about the postwar price
level, taxes, the present state of fixed equipment, standards of
conservative financial practice as reflected in balance sheets, and
many other factors enter into such estimates. in view of all these
difficulties it is hazardous to try to discover whether corporations
3See,for instance, S. Morris Livingston and E. T. Weiler, "Can Business Finance
the Transition?" Survey of Current Business, February 1944, pp. 9-11; Frederick C.
Dirks, "The Rising Liquidity of Manufacturing Companies and Its Implications for
Financing Postwar Conversion," Journal of 1/ic American Statistical Association,
June 1944, pp. 207-17; several press releases of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (Statistical Series, Release No. 739 and 742) ; Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1944-.88 CorporateCash flalances,
will need outside funds for reconversion; the result depends on
these basic assumptions, which pave the way for a wide variety
of answers.
Such estimates as are made apply to the corporate universe.
If they could be made accurately, they. would indicate whether all
corporations taken as a unit do need (or do not need) funds from
outside. \Vithin the corporate universe there are, of course, great
differences between individual companies and industries. Corpora-
tions which have to reconvert largely to a different kind of pro-
duction may be short of funds whereas others, for which the
reconversion problem is slight, may have more funds than they
need. Even if the funds available for reconversion are sufficient
for the corporate universe, many individual companies will need
"outside" funds, whereas others can supply such funds because
they will have more than they need for their own reconversion.
The investigation in the preceding chapter has shown that differ-
ences exist with respect to liquid funds (excluding what the cor-
porations will obtain from the government) between such groups
as large manufacturing corporations on the one hand and medium-
sized and small manufacturing corporations on the other.
In view of the current discussion of the reconversion problem, a
point that should be emphasized is that the speed with which
conversion to peacetime production can be carried out does not
depend on whether the companies have sufficient funds or need
to borrow. Borrowed funds are just as good as the corporations'
own funds from this point of view. But even the total of liquid
funds (including borrowed funds) available for conversion tells
us little about the possibilities of a rapid conversion to peacetime
production. The rapidity of conversion is mainly (though not
entirely) a production problem.
From the point of view of the economic system as a whole, the
ease of conversion obviously depends on the quantity of goods and
the amount of equipment which can be readily shifted to peace-
time production, either within the concerns that possess the goods
or by transfer to other concerns that can utilize the materials.
Even if all corporations are extremely liquid, it will neverthless
be difficult, or even impossible at first, for some of them to obtain
the materials and machine parts which they will need.For
example, many corporations will have to wait several months whileObservations on Liquidity Position 89
their raw materials are being processed by other corporations.
In all probability, some unemployment will exist, since many coii-
cerns may not be able to employ their full complement of men
while making adaptations in respect to plant and machinery.
Difficulties arise in attempting to obtain any quantitative esti-
mate of the size of the portion of wartime equipment and stocks
of goods in factories and warehouses when the war ends, which
can be converted to the production of peacetime go.ods either at
once or within a short space of time.Conditions in regard to
inventories will vary greatly from industry to industry: some
inventories will be nonspecific and will be readily shifted; others,
such as ammunition, will be pbsolete; and still others, such as
substitute materials, will suffer a severe decline in market value
even if they do not become obsolete. in many cases the necessary
materials will be entirely lacking and stocks will have to be built
up again from the beginning.
The conversion of fixed equipment to the production of peace-
time goods, on the other hand, does not present so formidable a
problem as might appear at first sight. Many of the machines
and tools have deliberately been constructed with an eye to "ver-
satility" and can be adapted to other uses by some relatively simple
technical adjustment, such as the changing of a part. Moreover,
a considerable quantity of old peacetime equipment has only to
be taken out of storage and reinstalled. Many concerns expect
to be able to make these adjustments within a few months.4 Again,
not all industries will be affected to the same extent. Undoubtedly,
excess capacity and will be characteristic of some
industries, while others will be hampered by a scarcity of equip-
ment because of the suspension of repairs and replacements dur-
ing the war. The development of new techniques of production,
and even of new products for which the future consumer demand
cannot now be forecast, adds to the difficulty of predicting the
effect of the readjustment on individual industries and concerns.
When the problem is considered from the standpoint of the
individual corporation, the ease with which the shift can be made
will depend first of all on the degree of convertibility of the cor-
poration's physical assets (machines, stocks of raw materials, and
See, General Motors Corporation, Annual Report for 1942, p. 63, and the returns
of a questionnaire sent out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.90 Corporate Cash Ralances, 1914-43
goods-in-process) to peacetime production within its own plants.
This ease will depend also on the individual corporation's financial
liquidity position, which measures ability in money terms to acquire
materials and other means of production. The liquidity of in-
dividual corporations and their access to bank credit will therefore
affect their relative positions5 in bidding for supplies and other
factors of production when the war is over.In this sense the
liquidity position (including the access to bank credit of each
individual concern)is important.But it remains true that the
aggregate of corporate funds (including bank loans) available for
reconversion is no measurement of the capacity of the economic
system as a whole to accomplish a speedy conversion to peacetime
production. Only in so far as the spending of large liquid funds
on the part of all corporations (and consumers) may provide the
stimulus for the conversion can we attach importance to the total
volume of funds (including bank loans) available for reconver-
sion.° But the physical condition of the productive apparatus in
the economy sets a limit to the speed of reconversion.
This last point indicates another problem that arises in con-
nection with the reconversion problem. If corporations draw on
their liquid funds in the reconversion period, they will sell market-
able securities partly to the banks, which gives rise to new deposits.
The same is true if they borrow from the banks. Even if at the
close of the war the Treasury were to cease borrowing from the
banks7 and thus stop one source of inflation, the corporate universe
(and also consumers), by drawing on its liquid funds or by bor-
rowing from the banks, could open a new one.
It may be contended that the inflationary danger emanating
from this source is under the control of the monetary authorities,
since they can always prevent the banks from buying additional
securities or from lending by keeping reserves down; and that
5Theadvantage of having larger liquid resources than other concerns may be re-
duced if rationing of materials and machine parts is maintained during the period
of readjustment.
6Fora detailed discussion of the reconversion problem see, A. D. H. Kaplan, The
Liquidation of War Production (Committee for Economic Development, New York,
1944).
TheTreasury will need funds for the purpose of contract termination. But even
if it should obtain the money by inflationary borrowing, this borrowing could not be
counted fully as an additional source of inflation, since part of the funds may be
used by business enterprise to build up its liquidity which will have been lowered by
drawing on cash and by selling marketable securities for the purpose of reconversion.Observations on Liquidity Position 91
thesale of securities by corporations (and consumers) to investors
other than commercial banks do not start inflationary tendencies,8
because they do not lead to the creation of additional deposits.
Therefore, provided the monetary authorities want to prevent
inflation, there apparently is no reason to fear it as a result of an
attempt of corporations and consumers to liquidate their market-
able securities or to borrow from the banks.
Such reasoningismisleading.Theoretically, the monetary
authorities could control the inflationary danger arising from the
sale of marketable securities by corporations (and consumers) or
from private borrowing. But they could do so only if they were
willing to let the prices of government securitiesfall and to
shoulder the responsibility of curbing a stimulus that would other-
wise encourage the conversion to peacetime production.
It has been pointed out that the amount of funds that may be
absorbed by the postwar conversion process cannot be gauged
accurately. Whether corporations will have to make use of bank
loans and other funds from outside sources, in addition to liqui-
dating part of their cash and their marketable securities, cannot
be estimated now. But if the assumptions are made that the liquid
funds in the hands of corporations, together with what they receive
from the government, are sufficient for conversion to peacetime
production, and that banks will be able to take over the marketable
securities liquidated by corporations, it follows that the tendency
for large industrial corporations to become more and more inde-
pendent of commercial banks, which characterized the interwar
period, will be strengthened still further.
Our study of cash balances in the thirties shows clearly what
the consequence of such a development would be.If enterprises
are independent of bank credit,9 fluctuations in business activity
will not lead to variations In bank loans and total deposits; instead
they will express themselves in the monetary sphere, by a changing
velocity of the circulation of money.1° In other words, the phe-
8Thisstatement is subject to the qualification that other investors do not purchase
these securities with balances formerly held idle.
9Fromthe point of view of the economic system as a whole this means that the
bulk of bank deposits is based on government securities.
10Thosewho believe that the monetary authority, by an appropriate policy of
selling securities to or retiring them from the banks, can avoid business cycles need
not accept this conclusion.92 CorporateCash Balances, 1914.43
nomenon of "free" cash, observed for large corporations in the
depression of the thirties, will become the rule for periods of
business contraction in the near future.in addition, it is likely
that the relative distribution of the total means of payment in a
period of depression will change in favor of business enterprises,
and in a period of upswing, in favor of consumers.
SUMMARY
(1) 'Whether liquid funds already in the possession of corporations together
with what they obtain from the government are sufficient for the recon-
version of corporations to peacetime production cannot be accurately
forecast at the present time.
(2) The speed of reconversion to peacetime production for the economic
system as a whole is not only a financial but also a production problem.
The physical condition of the production apparatus at the time when
reconversion begins on a large scale sets a limit to the speed of recon-
version.
(3)If corporations use their liquid funds for reconversion purposes or
borrow from the banks, and if consumers liquidate their securities, an
inflationary source is likely to be opened up which will be difficult for
the monetary authorities to control.
(4)If reconversion to peacetime production can be accomplished without
recourse to bank loans, business fluctuations in the immediate future
are likely to express themselves in the monetary field by changes in the
velocity of circulation of money instead of by changes in bank loans
and deposits.